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INTRODUCTION

“The state, as political scientists insist, is
still the predominant supplier of effective
public governance and is still an immensely
powerful institution. But there is a strong
and

persistent

tension

between

state

sovereignty, which is territorially bounded,
and the non-territorial space for social
interaction created by computer networks.”
Milton Mueller, Networks And States

In recent years, much has been written about the forces of globalisation eclipsing the
authority of the nation-state. Examples include supranational institutions such as the
European Union, as well as transnational networks of activists mobilised around various
global issues such as inequality and climate change. One of the primary factors usually
credited with enabling this trend is the proliferation of the internet, which is inherently
transnational and decentralised.
While the networked architecture of the internet may have undermined the significance of
national borders, this is not to say that states have found themselves sidelined on the issue
of internet governance. On the contrary, debates over how the internet should be governed
have frequently centered on questions regarding the appropriate role of the state.
Broadly speaking, two primary factions in these debates have coalesced around competing
visions of the appropriate governance model for internet administration. Those in favour
of a minimal role for the state tend to embrace a multistakeholder approach, which enjoins
national governments to participate in regulatory forums on equal footing with both
civil society and the private sector. Those who seek a robust role for the state in internet
governance often support multilateral or intergovernmental arrangements, in which states
are the primary interlocutors in policy discussions administered by the UN.
Since the first major global internet governance conference in 2003, debates over the
proper role of the state in determining global internet policy have continued to dominate
the agenda. This report explores the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the global
conversation on internet governance, and the manner in which its domestic policies of
internet control inform, and are in turn informed by, its engagements with global internet
governance forums.
The report begins by providing an overview of the history of internet governance, ranging
from the 1969 birth of ARPANET up to the present day.1 This historical and contextual study
forms the central component of Chapter I.

1 Those familiar with the history of internet governance may wish to skip directly to Chapter II: Iran and
Internet Governance.
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After identifying the primary points of contention within the global internet governance
debate, Chapter II moves to provide an outline of Iran’s domestic objectives and methods
of internet control. This chapter demonstrates the confluences and incongruities between
Iran’s domestic and international policy objectives in the areas of content filtering, internet
control, and infrastructural development. This is achieved through an interrogation of Iran’s
contributions to internet governance conferences, as well as publicly recorded statements
from leading figures in the field of Iranian ICT policy.
Chapter III is concerned with the manner in which Iran formulates and executes internet
governance policy. It examines the institutional context and bureaucratic practices of
Iran, and shows how they have shaped the country’s domestic and international policymaking processes and global alliances at internet governance events. This final chapter
concludes with an examination of the role of non-state actors in the Iranian internet
governance debate. In part, this is achieved by interrogating the narrative patterns of the
Iranian media on issues of internet governance, in order to ascertain the current status of
public discourse on internet governance issues. Finally, the chapter turns to a study of the
2014 Persian IGF, and discusses the extent to which it signals a government pivot towards
multistakeholderism, at least in a domestic context.
This study is based on a number of interviews with leading experts in the internet
governance field, media analysis, and the study of available documents released by the
Islamic Republic of Iran and numerous international internet governance organisations. It is
worth noting at this point that the lack of transparency practiced by the Iranian government
and international organisations, and the security concerns of Iranian internet activists
have made some sources inaccessible, and some potential contributors unwilling to speak
on the record, or at all. We acknowledge that this study does not necessarily provide a
comprehensive account of Iran’s engagements in the internet governance sphere, but
believe that this report makes a worthwhile contribution to the fields of internet governance
and Iranian studies.
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1.
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES
IN INTERNET GOVERNANCE

Before delving into the ongoing debates around the role of the state in the regulation of the
global internet, it is first important to chart the history of the internet’s development, and to
develop an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various bodies that have
been established to oversee, manage, and facilitate its growth.
This short history of internet governance will prove essential in contextualising Iran’s role
within contemporary systems of internet governance, its objectives, and its activities.

I. A BRIEF(ISH) HISTORY OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
The technical origins of today’s internet lie in a project funded by the United States
Department of Defence, known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(ARPANET). First deployed in October 1969, ARPANET was one of the world’s first packetswitching computer networks, run by the academics and engineers who created it. By
1984, the development of these networks prompted ARPA - by this point renamed DARPA
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) - to create the Internet Activities Board,
comprised of a number of task forces. One of the resulting organisations became known as
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), created in 1986 to manage the development of
technical standards for the internet.
In terms of governance, the early internet endured little formal regulation. As Castells
explains, “decisions made by the IETF were made by consensus, and involved a wide variety
of individuals and institutions. By and large, the internet emerged in a legal vacuum with
little supervision from regulatory agencies... The agencies that were created developed on
an ad hoc basis to solve the needs of the users of the network” (2009: 103). One of the most
important regulatory functions concerned overseeing the coordination of domain names
with IP addresses, root zone management and the allocation of country code top-level
domains (ccTLDs).
Throughout the mid 1980s and early 90s, these tasks were mostly performed by one man,
University of Southern California engineering professor Jon Postel, under contract with
DARPA. The organisation resulting from this arrangement became known as the Internet
Assigned Names Authority (IANA).
In 1993, management of the internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) was delegated to a
private American company, Network Solutions Inc., which signed a five year contract with
the U.S. government’s National Science Foundation (NSF). The expiration of Network
Solutions’ contract in 1998 roughly coincided with Postel’s death, creating an administrative
vacuum which needed to be quickly filled in order to preserve the internet’s functionality. As
Castells explains, “at the expiration of the NSI’s contract with the NSF in 1998, and without
Postel present to function as the trusted guarantor of the assignment of IP addresses,
pressure increased to formalise the institutional management of the internet.” (Ibid: 104).
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ICANN // ‘ONE WORLD. ONE INTERNET.’
The size and commercial value of the burgeoning market in information services constituted
an additional factor which prompted intensified calls for management of the internet’s
infrastructure (especially domain names and IP address numbers) to be delegated to
official institutions. Indeed, Castells points out that “[a]s the internet became a hugely
profitable opportunity for business investments, President Clinton directed the Secretary
of Commerce to privatize the DNS on July 1,1997, in a way that increased competition and
facilitated international participation in its management. The US Department of Commerce
implemented the directive and established ICANN [the non-profit Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers] in November 1998” (2009: 104).
The creation of ICANN to manage the internet’s domain names and IP addresses proved a
pivotal event in the history of internet governance, and remains a hotly debated issue to this
day. Mueller (2010: 61) identifies four structural features of ICANN that have attracted the ire
of large parts of the global community:
1.

It is necessarily transnational, as a global internet requires global coordination of names
and addresses;
2. It is one of the few globally centralised points of control over the internet;
3. It is dominated by private and non-state actors;
4. It is overseen by a single sovereign nation, and “the world’s only remaining superpower,
the United States”.
These ICANN-related grievances bring us back to the question of the proper role for the
nation state in global internet governance. As we have seen, the proliferation of the global
internet in the 1990s was enabled in large part by agreements between private firms,
independent of government regulation.
Yet this arrangement resulted in the creation of a non-profit organisation to manage names
and addresses which not only constituted a centralised point of control over the internet,
but also was managed exclusively by the United States, handing the government significant
influence. As Mueller explains, “at the very top ICANN was in fact beholden - contractually
and politically - to the U.S. government” (Ibid: 62).
At subsequent internet governance events, it is precisely this form of American oversight of
ICANN that many other national governments, especially those from developing countries,
have most strenuously objected to.
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A
12/2003
World Summit on Information Society I,
Geneva
Arising out of the ITU’s 1998 Plenipotentiary
Conference, the first WSIS event was framed
as an opportunity to “formulate a common
vision and understanding of the global
information society” and “harness the
potential of knowledge and technology to
promote the development goals of the
Millennium Declaration.”
The primary accomplishment of the first
phase was the declaration of a range of
broad principles related to internet
governance, known as the ‘Geneva
Principles’. This document affirmed that
“The international management of the
internet Dshould be multilateral, transparent
and democratic, with the full involvement of
governments, the private sector, civil society
and international organizations.”

2005

2006

B
11/2005
World Summit on Information Society II,
Tunis
In September 2005, just a few months
before the second phase of WSIS, the
American position suffered a major setback
when the European Union broke ranks and
began publicly calling for changes in the
way ICANN was managed.
Debates in Tunis centred on American
control of ICANN and the appropriate role
of nation-states in internet governance.
After several days of tough negotiations, the
summit concluded with the production of a
document known as the “Tunis Agenda”,
which paved the way for future reforms to
ICANN by challenging certain aspects of the
existing ICANN regime, and legitimising the
role of government in determining internet
governance policies. It also established the
IGF, an annual multi-stakeholder venue for
dialogues on internet governance issues.
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10,11/2005 - 10,11/2016 (Annually)
Internet Governance Forum
The IGF was established as a non-binding,
multi-stakeholder forum in which internet
governance issues could be discussed. The
IGF introduced a procedural approach that
deviated from the state-centric model of
WSIS, adopting a multi-stakeholder model
in which states agreed to participate on an
equal footing with civil society groups and
private sector contributors.

12/2012
World Conference on International
Communications
Unlike the IGF and WSIS, the WCIT is a
treaty-level conference hosted by the
International Telecommunications Union.
This means that the event was fundamentally intergovernmental, with representatives of various nation-states coming
together to discuss global telecommunications policy.

While the IGF was a multi-stakeholder
forum - in contrast to the state-centric WSIS
- the question of the proper role of the
nation state remained the primary bone of
contention.

In terms of procedure, ITU events operate
by consensus rather than majority vote;
member states negotiate over potential
resolutions until a final agreement is
reached, to which participating states
consent to be bound. Once a treaty is
adopted, its provisions become international law. However after several days of
protracted and often contentious debate,
no consensus was reached, and the
conference concluded with about half of
the nations present refusing to sign the
final treaty.

4/2014
E.NETmundial: Global Multistakeholder
Meeting on the Future of Internet
Governance
In the wake of the diplomatic fallout
prompted by the NSA surveillance scandal,
the government of Brazil convened
NETmundial. The event, attended by over
850 government officials, campaigners,
technical experts and academics, served as a
venue for the continuation of the
long-running debate over the role of the
state in internet governance.
The primary accomplishment of the event
was the production of a non-binding
resolution registering the preference of most
stakeholder groups to see control of the
internet’s names and addressing system
shifted from ICANN to a multi-stakeholder
body.

E
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C

C

2015

II. CONTEMPORARY INTERNET GOVERNANCE // EVENTS AND INSTITUTIONS
The 1998 establishment of ICANN overshadowed a coterminous event which would
portend profound implications for global internet governance. At the 1998 Plenipotentiary
Conference of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the UN agency responsible
for information and communication technologies, a resolution was adopted calling for
‘a world summit on the information society’. The purpose of the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS) was “to formulate a common vision and understanding of the
global information society” and to “harness the potential of knowledge and technology to
promote the development goals of the Millennium Declaration” (Ibid: 58).
The summit was held in two phases: the first in Geneva in 2003, and the second in Tunis in
2005. While originally intended to cover a range of issues associated with the ‘information
society,’ WSIS was dominated by contentious debates over ICANN and its relationship with
the U.S. government (Ibid: 60).

WSIS I // 2003 // GENEVA
During the Geneva phase of WSIS in 2003, the government of Brazil led the broad coalition of countries critical of the ICANN status quo. Contesting the dominant role of both the
United States and the private sector, they argued that “the internet is a public resource that
should be managed by national governments and, at an international level, by an intergovernmental body such as the International Telecommunications Union” (Ibid: 64).
At the same time, the European Commission pushed for a new model of internet governance
based on inter-state cooperation in policy making; a position supported publicly by Iran and
Saudi Arabia, and criticised harshly by former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt on the basis
that it threatened the future of the internet (Wray, 2005). The challenges raised by these
“state sovereignty hawks” were too formidable to be resolved at Geneva phase, and were
taken up again in Tunis in 2005.
The primary accomplishment of the first phase was the declaration of a range of broad
principles related to internet governance. These principles (which became known as
the “Geneva Principles”) affirmed, inter alia, that “the international management of the
internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of
governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations” (ITU, 2003a).
With these principles duly affirmed, and the debate over the U.S. government’s relationship
with ICANN left unresolved, the stage was set for a showdown at the second phase of WSIS
in Tunis.
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WSIS II // 2005 // TUNIS
In preparation for the Tunis Phase, the Geneva declaration asked the UN Secretary General
to establish a working group on internet governance (WGIG) to develop a definition of
internet governance, identify relevant policy issues, and delineate respective roles and
responsibilities to various stakeholder groups.
In the summer of 2005, two weeks before the scheduled release of the WGIG report, the
U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) released a short statement announcing: “The United States Government intends to
preserve the security and stability of the internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System.”
This commitment to “security and stability” underpinned the U.S. government’s intention
“to maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative
root zone file” (NTIA, 2005). The timing and blunt language of the statement exacerbated
an already fractious rift between those aiming to preserve the ICANN status quo and those
seeking a greater role for national governments and intergovernmental institutions.
In September 2005, just a few months before the Tunis phase, the American position
suffered a major setback when the European Union broke ranks and began publicly calling
for the reform of ICANN. From the American perspective, this move was surprising, as
opposition to the ICANN status quo tended to be concentrated among the governments of
developing countries (Mueller, 2010: 74). With the Global South and EU aligning against the
US’s position, the battle lines for the Tunis Phase were clearly drawn.
As with the first phase of the WSIS, debates in Tunis centred on American control of ICANN
and the appropriate role of (other) nation-states in internet governance. After several days
of tough negotiations, the summit concluded with the production of a document known as
‘The Tunis Agenda for the Information Society.’ One of the main results of the Tunis Agenda
was that it paved the way for future changes to ICANN. In Mueller’s phrasing, it did this
“first, by incorporating challenges to specific aspects of the current ICANN regime in its
text, and second, by insisting on the authority of governments to define ‘public policy’ for
the internet” (Ibid: 77). In addition, the Tunis Agenda authorized the creation of an Internet
Governance Forum (IGF).

IGF // 2006-2016
The IGF was established as a non-binding, multistakeholder forum in which internet
governance issues could be discussed. “The creation of the IGF,” argues Mueller, “was widely
understood to be the kind of agreement that could get the WSIS out of its impasse; it
allowed the critics to continue raising their issues in an official forum but, as a non-binding
discussion arena, could not do much harm to those interested in preserving the status quo”
(Ibid).
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Importantly, the IGF introduced a procedural approach that deviated from the state-centric
model of WSIS. As Masters explains, “the establishment of the IGF was noteworthy for its
embrace of a multistakeholder model (a model also utilized by ICANN), where states—
including many authoritarian governments—agreed to participate in policy discussions on an
equal footing with private sector and civil society groups” (Masters, 2014).
Despite the structural differences between the IGF and WSIS, the question of the proper
role of the nation state remained the primary bone of contention. Debate on this issue
has continued to rage over the past ten years, reaching a fever pitch at the 2012 World
Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai.

WCIT // 2012 // DUBAI
Unlike the IGF and WSIS, the WCIT is a treaty-level conference hosted by the International
Telecommunications Union. This means that the event was fundamentally intergovernmental,
with representatives of various nation-states coming together to discuss global
telecommunications policy. In particular, the WCIT was convened to review the International
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs), the binding global treaty (adopted in 1988) which
aims to ensure the availability, efficiency and interoperability of a broad range of information
and communication services (ITU, 2012a).
In terms of procedure, ITU events operate by consensus rather than majority vote; member
states negotiate over potential resolutions until a final agreement is reached, to which
participating states consent to be bound. Once a treaty is adopted, its provisions become
international law. However after several days of protracted and often contentious debate,
no consensus was reached, and the conference concluded with about half of the nations
present refusing to sign the final treaty (ITU, 2012b). At issue was the familiar question
of the extent to which national governments should exert control over the institutional
management of the internet.
Signs of trouble surfaced early on, with a dispute breaking out over language in the
preamble to the new treaty. The new preamble asserted that ITU members “recognize the
right of access of Member States to international telecommunication services” (ITU, 2013:
1). This wording was adopted by vote rather than consensus, marking a deviation from
standard ITU protocol.
As the conference progressed, these initial quibbles devolved into entrenched antagonisms.
One of the clearest illustrations of growing rift between factions can be seen in the
dispute over Resolution 3, which was adopted under controversial circumstances including
allegations of procedural irregularities (Fidler, 2013). In addition to emphasizing the
important role the ITU should play in internet governance, the resolution went on to state
that “all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international internet
governance” (Ibid).
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Fundamentally, disputes at WCIT were anchored in competing views on whether or not
the principles, norms and regulations of internet governance should be enshrined in
international law. Those opposed to this position aimed to preserve the ICANN status quo,
and questioned whether the ITU should be involved in the business of internet governance
at all. The question of the proper role of the state in internet governance was left
unresolved, with the end of the conference bringing no solutions to this intractable problem.
The case made by those in favour of the ICANN status quo rested on the belief that the
United States could be trusted not to abuse its privileged position as the sole overseer of
critical internet resources. This argument was dealt a significant blow in June 2013, when
whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that the National Security Agency (NSA) had
been running a secret and pervasive internet surveillance programme. Global protests were
swift and widespread (Gabbatt, 2014), and while NSA spying had little to do with ICANN
(Masters, 2014), the revelations severely undermined global trust in the U.S. government to
oversee critical internet resources impartially.
In a move widely viewed as an attempt to placate growing anger over the surveillance
scandal, the U.S. government announced in March 2014 its intention to transition control
over key aspects of the internet’s domain name functions to the global multistakeholder
community (NTIA, 2014). It wouldn’t be long until the forum hawks seeking ICANN reforms
seized on this opportunity.

NETMUNDIAL // 2014 // SAO PAOLO
In the wake of the diplomatic fallout prompted by the NSA surveillance scandal, the government of Brazil convened NETmundial, a two-day internet governance event held in Sao Paulo on April 23-24, 2014. The event, attended by over 850 government officials, campaigners,
technical experts and academics (Kelion, 2014), served as a venue for the continuation of
the long-running debate over the role of the state in internet governance.
The primary accomplishment of the event was the production of a non-binding resolution
registering the preference of most stakeholder groups to see control of the internet’s names
and addressing system shifted from ICANN to a multistakeholder body (Business Standard,
2014). The resolution also favoured “open, participative, consensus-based governance”
(NETmundial, 2014a). Yet consensus proved difficult to reach. An influential minority of
countries, including Russia, China, India and Iran, refused to sign the resolution because they
preferred a multilateral (i.e. inter-governmental) approach to internet governance (Business
Standard, 2014).
As with all the other governance events discussed above, the primary bone of contention at
NetMundial hinged on the role of national governments in internet regulation.
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THE DEBATE TODAY
While the various internet governance fora discussed above vary in terms of structure,
participation and authority, the issue of the proper role for the nation-state in internet
governance permeated them all. It is against this contentious backdrop that the present
study is situated. Using the case study of Iran, we will unpack the tensions surrounding
American control of ICANN, and the broader question of the relationship between national
governments and internet governance. By taking a detailed look at the statements and
positions Iran takes at global internet governance fora, and looking at how these topics are
discussion in domestic Iranian media, we aim to offer a unique and nuanced overview of
Iran’s contributions to the global internet governance debate.
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2.
IRAN AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a great many interests in engaging with the issue of global
internet governance, and has been an active participant in governance events since the
foundational 2003 WSIS forum in Geneva.
Although Iran has worked to legitimise and reinforce its internet surveillance and control
apparatus at international forums, it cannot be directly inferred that Iran simply participates
in these events in order to perpetuate or reinforce its own domestic internet policies.
Iran has been a consistent critic of existing structures of internet governance, and of the
distribution of power in the international system. Iran is not alone in its criticisms, however;
the Islamic Republic has found itself a member of the broad coalition of state sovereignty
‘hawks’ that first coalesced in Geneva. These hawks have consistently sought to shift the
balance of power in the internet governance sphere away from the hegemony of the United
States, and towards a model in which other states hold more influence over the formulation
and development of global internet governance policy, through multilateral engagement in
empowered international organisations.
Although unified broadly by its opposition to the status quo, the hawk coalition is a
politically diverse one made up of countries ranging from the liberal democracies of Brazil,
Argentina, and South Africa, to the authoritarian states of Syria, China, and Saudi Arabia.
To call this a coalition, however, is a slight over-reach; it does not agree on every issue, and
there is little in the way of policy coordination between many of these state actors; various
‘hawk’ nations pursue divergent objectives.
One additional point: as is the case for most states, domestic political factors and policy
initiatives influence Iran’s global practices and its role in this ‘hawkish’ coalition. Therefore,
it is important to establish Iran’s domestic policy goals, and determine how they help to
inform the state’s objectives and activities at international internet governance forums. This
segment of the report will discuss and contextualise Iran’s domestic and international policy
objectives, describe the manner in which internet governance policy is formulated, and
explain why the Iranian authorities pursue this course.

I. ‘ENEMY OF THE INTERNET’ // IRAN’S DOMESTIC ICT POLICY
In order to place Iran’s internet governance policies in the proper context, this following
segment offers a brief overview of the ICT issues that have dominated the country’s
domestic policy agenda, including content filtering, the development of a state-regulated
‘National Internet’, alongside a number of ambitious infrastructure development initiatives.
Although this overview is not comprehensive, it illustrates a number of instances where
there has been an interplay between Iran’s domestic and international internet policy goals.
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On the whole, Iran’s domestic internet policy objectives are illiberal in nature, and have
attracted criticism from international NGOs. Iran has one of the worst internet freedom
records in the world, to the extent that Iran’s extensive history of online censorship has
seen it branded one of the “twelve enemies of the internet” by Reporters Without Borders
(2012). Its domestic policies are primarily focused around maintaining, empowering, and
legitimising its efforts to monitor and control internet access. Iran has pursued these
objectives aggressively on the home front, filtering vast quantities of online content and
investing in the development of new technologies and infrastructure to facilitate state
surveillance on a massive scale.
But parallel to these authoritarian policy initiatives, Iran has been an energetic developer of
internal and international internet infrastructure. Domestically, Iran has extended internet
access to tens of thousands of isolated towns and villages, and encouraged internet ‘literacy’
amongst the wider population. On the international front, economic imperatives have led to
Iran to push for the development of significant new international infrastructure networks to
transfer data between Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.

ACCESS IS FORBIDDEN! // CONTENT FILTERING
Iran practices online content filtering on a massive scale, restricting access to around half of
the 500 top-ranked sites on Alexa through a combination of keyword filtering, connection
throttling, and DNS hijacking methods (Aryan et al., 2013). Pages relating to cultural,
political and sexual themes are blocked extensively,
One of the most powerful technologies Iran uses to monitor and control internet traffic is
‘Deep Packet Inspection’ (DPI), a technology that was standardised by the ITU in 2012. DPI
enables authorities to monitor data packets as they pass through a network, and enabling
them to be filtered on the basis of pre-determined criteria.
In 2012, the circumvention tool Tor identified DPI as one of the main filtering techniques
impacting upon Iranians’ ability to connect with their service (Tor Project, 2012). The
encrypted chat tool Cryptocat reported similar problems stemming from DPI content
filtering in 2013 (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2013).
The 2013 election of President Rouhani held the promise of a shift in Iran’s position on
content filtering. In 2014, the president stated his opposition to the current filtering
programme: “Some people think we can fix these problems by building walls, but when
you create filters, they create proxies... this [current policy] does not work. Force does not
produce results” (The National, 2014).
So far, these words haven’t been accompanied by tangible policy shifts. In November 2014,
the page of the popular online game ‘Clash of Clans’ was blocked, along with a number
of Instagram images hosted by Facebook, and (bizarrely) the website of long-deceased
revolutionary leader Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti (Small Media, 2014a). It appears
that Iran’s filtering system is set to remain a cornerstone of its ICT policy programme for
some time to come.
15

...AND STAY OUT! // NATIONAL INTERNET (SHOMA)
Iran has worked to assert state sovereignty over the internet in an even more overt manner
than simple content filtering. Since 2006, Iran has been working to develop its own ‘National
Internet’, in a project commonly referred to in Iran as ‘SHOMA’. The planned structure of
the SHOMA network was described in-depth by President Rouhani’s ICT Minister Mahmood
Vaezi in August 2013, when he described it as ‘A private and secure internal network... an
aggregation of private, local and national networks.’ (Small Media, 2014b)
According to the ICT Ministry, the development of the SHOMA network is being conducted
in four phases:

1. The construction of a network capable of separating local and international traffic.
SHOMA will be an independent high-speed network that connects all government
organisations.
2. The hosting and registration of Iranian websites on local servers and .ir domains
respectively.
3. The provision of domestically developed applications and services including an OS,
email service, search engine, and communication apps
4. The production and promotion of online content (Small Media, 2014b: 7)
Numerous critics from international media have warned that its development marks a
stepping stone towards the ultimate objective of cutting Iran off from the global network
entirely. The replication of such measures on a global scale would constitute a ‘balkanisation’
of the internet into national spheres. Vaezi contests the assertion that this is Iran’s ultimate
objective, asserting instead that:
“SHOMA is not in competition with the internet; Iran is not cutting Iranian users’ access to the
‘global’ internet. If users cannot find the data that they are looking for on SHOMA, then they
will be able to access the internet to search for it, instead” (in Small Media 2014b: 7).
It remains to be seen how far these promises hold up, as SHOMA continues to be trapped
in development purgatory. Originally slated for release in late 2006 (Fars News, 2006),
SHOMA’s launch has been delayed numerous times, and it remains unclear exactly when the
fully-functional network will be set for unveiling.
Although Iran has forged ahead with the project independently of the decisions made at
international internet governance events, the whole notion of a ‘National Internet’ cannot be
separated from Iran’s expressed interests in empowering national governments and securing
rights of ‘national sovereignty’ over domestic networks.
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NETWORKING SKILLS // INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Over the past decade, Iran has prioritised the development of new infrastructure, both
for the purposes of extending domestic internet access, and facilitating large-scale (and
immensely profitable) international data routing through the country.
The expansion of internet infrastructure has been a priority for the government ever since
the pioneering Shahkooh village development project of 2002, which saw the tiny village
in the Alborz mountains connected to the world wide web. Since then, development has
continued at a rapid pace: in 2014 Iran’s ICT Minister Mahmood Vaezi claimed that Iran had
extended internet access to 4300 ‘rural areas’, constructing over 10,000 ‘rural ICT centers’ in
the process (Vaezi, 2014).
Iran has also sought to position itself as a regional information hub, with its central
geographic location offering a pathway to transfer data between Europe and Asia. As
Mahmoud Khosravi, managing director of Iran’s Telecommunication Infrastructure Company
(TIC), puts it:
“The exceptional geographical position of Iran locating between two strategic
telecommunications regions of Middle East and Europe as well as its international
connections in twenty border points brings about a vast telecom potential for traffic
transmission” (EPEG, 2015).
Iran’s involvement with the Europe-Persia Express Gateway (EPEG) fiber-optic cable system2
is one high-profile example of the work the country has been undertaking to support global
internet infrastructure development at the same time as it has been pushing for the national
segmentation of the internet.

II. INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUMS AND IRANIAN DOMESTIC POLICY
Ultimately, international internet governance forums are limited in their ability to influence
the development of internet policy in Iran, or any other participating states. Iran has
developed its own comprehensive set of internet regulations and control mechanisms
completely independently of international telecommunications regulations and internet
governance treaties; at no point has the development of SHOMA, or the country’s filtering
programme been threatened by the outcomes of internet governance forums like the IGF
or WCIT.

2 EPEG’s website explains that “the EPEG allows a telecommunication transit route alternative to the
Red Sea, Suez Canal, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea regions and plays an important role for traffic
re-routing in case of earthquakes and disasters, which have been known to affect multiple systems at
once” (EPEG, 2015).
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As Mahmood Enayat, Director of the London-based NGO Small Media states:
“They don't need any global initiatives to control their networks inside Iran... what they're
advocating externally, they already do internally.” (Personal interview, 2014)
Nonetheless, international internet governance forums have played an important role in
legitimising the use of state power to regulate and control communications networks. The
flexible wording and lack of explicit human rights language in many internet governance
documents have enabled authoritarian governments such as Iran’s to legitimise their efforts
to strangle off internet access and engage in mass online surveillance of its citizens.

CHASING LEGITIMACY // FILTERING AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE
THE ITU CONSTITUTION // LICENSE TO THROTTLE
The constitution of the ITU itself is one such document offering authoritarian governments
breathing space to engage in draconian measures of internet control. Article 34 permits
states to sever communications networks on the basis of perceived security threats, ‘illegal’
activities, and nebulously-defined threats to ‘public order or decency’.

1.

ARTICLE 34 - STOPPAGE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Member States reserve the right to stop, in accordance with their national law, the
transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the
State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency, provided that they immediately
notify the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram or any part thereof, except
when such notification may appear dangerous to the security of the State.

2. Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in accordance with their national law, any
other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security of the
State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency.
At WCIT-12, the ITU’s Secretary-General Dr. Hamadoun Touré reiterated the inviolability of
Article 34, stating that any new International Telecoms Regulations (ITRs) ‘cannot contradict
that provision’. In this manner, the legitimacy of ‘emergency’ state censorship is entrenched
in the international system of internet governance (ITU, 2012). As a result, it becomes
difficult for the international community to legitimately criticise Iran for its methods of
strangling off the internet in times of political unrest.
Iranian authorities seemingly feel little embarrassment about their actions, either; internet
speeds were throttled extensively in the immediate run-up to the 2013 presidential elections,
with former ICT Minister Mohammad Hassan Nami admitting that the state ordered the
restriction of internet speeds in order to “preserve calm” during a period of high political
tension (Esfandiari, 2013). The inviolability of Article 34 strips the ITU of the ability to
criticise authoritarian state practices, thereby tacitly encouraging their perpetuation.
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WCIT-12 // FILTER FREELY
The rapid uptake of DPI technology over the past few years has been facilitated in part by
the outcomes of global internet governance forums, with WCIT-12 playing an important part
in the development and standardisation of the technology. Prior to WCIT-12, there were no
industry standards for the development and implementation of DPI technology, meaning
that compatibility between different manufacturers’ models was not guaranteed.
Technical document Y.2770 resolved this issue. Entitled ‘Requirements for deep packet
inspection in Next Generation Networks’, Y.2770 sets out recommendations for DPI technical
standards. It was adopted in November 2012 by a special group within the ITU, known as the
World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA-12), which met in the run-up to
WCIT-12 (Horten, 2012).
By itself, Y.2770 is a non-binding technical guideline calling for the widespread
implementation of DPI technology into next-generation (IPv6) networks, but it provides
no guidelines as to how states should (or shouldn’t) utilise the technology. However, two
amendments to the International Telecoms Regulations (ITRs), accepted by a majority of
states at WCIT-12, may effectively mandate the implementation and usage of the technology
by states. At the very least, allows them the space to legitimise their use of DPI technology
to monitor and regulate citizens’ internet usage in the eyes of the international community.
The ITRs in question are:
ARTICLE 5A
Security and robustness of networks
41B Member States shall individually and collectively endeavour to ensure the security and
robustness of international telecommunication networks in order to achieve effective use
thereof and avoidance of technical harm thereto, as well as the harmonious development of
international telecommunication services offered to the public.

ARTICLE 5B
Unsolicited bulk electronic communications
41C Member States should endeavour to take necessary measures to prevent the
propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on
international telecommunication services. Member States are encouraged to cooperate in
that sense (ITU, 2013: 6).
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The potential implications of Y.2770 and the WCIT-12 ITR amendments have been hotly
disputed by internet governance experts. Olivier Crepin-Leblond, a UK-based nongovernmental WCIT-12 delegate for the Internet Society argued that the ITR amendments
were problematic, and in conjunction with Y.2770 could have serious negative impacts upon
global internet freedom:
“Several parts of the ITRs were deeply flawed. [Article] 5A needs to be read along with ITU
Standard Y.2770, which makes it mandatory to implement deep packet inspection (and not
even a mild case of DPI) to all ‘next generation networks’ which could be easily interpreted as
the IPv6 network.
“As a standard it is far from mandatory. But 5A and 5B bring this much closer to [making] it
mandatory – and you’ll notice that the language in Y.2770 is very close to the language of 5A
and 5B” (Crepin-Leblond, in Mueller, 2012).
Iran voted to approve the final WCIT-12 treaty, including these contentious articles. The
extent to which Iran will lean on these ITRs as a means of justifying its existing filtering
policies is as yet unknown, as the WCIT treaty only entered into force in Iran on 15 January
2015.

STATES’ RIGHTS! // SHOMA, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNET
GOVERNANCE
As a member of the ‘sovereignty hawk’ coalition of developing states, Iran has been a
particularly vociferous opponent of the status quo in which the relationship between ICANN
and the US Department of Commerce grants the American government influence over the
global DNS root zone, gTLDs, and ccTLDs.3
The ability of the US government to unilaterally oversee the body responsible for
coordinating the global internet’s identifier system has remained a point of contention
with the international community ever since WSIS-03. Since then, developing countries
have worked tirelessly to wrest these powers from the US, and articulate an alternative
system of internet governance in which the international community plays an active role in
determining global internet governance policies.

DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILISATIONS // WSIS-03
WSIS-03 saw President Khatami and his government lead Iran’s first real foray into the
realm of internet governance. Given that subsequent major forums took place during the
conservative Ahmadinejad presidency, the country’s 2003 contributions offer the best
window into reformist politicians’ internet governance objectives.

3 In addition to its contract with ICANN, the US Government’s influence is underpinned by an assertion
of ‘policy authority’ over any modifications to the DNS root zone file, which the Department of
Commerce has been making since 1998. For a discussion, see Mueller (2010: 62-63).
20

The former Iranian MP and reformist activist Aliakbar Mousavi Khoeini contends that the
Khatami government was much more open to engagement with other countries on a variety
of issues:
“The reformists’ government... prioritised the development of Iran’s international presence
on the issue [of internet governance], despite a number of criticisms from inside the
country” (Interview, e-mail correspondence, 2014).
Indeed, the documents submitted by Iran to WSIS-03’s Preparatory Committee 3
demonstrate that Iran was an active contributor to debates on a number of internet
governance issues in the run-up to the Geneva conference, and was not focused on the
matter of state sovereignty alone.
Khatami’s delegation was particularly concerned with using WSIS-03 to advance an agenda
predicated on the protection of ‘national culture’. Iran proposed that progress towards the
‘information society’ should be partly predicated on the UNESCO Constitution (Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003a: 1). Iran went on to restate the Khatami-era mantra of
‘Dialogue Among Civilisations’, suggesting that the objective “to promote dialogue among
cultures and civilizations” be added to the paragraph 1 of the Draft Declaration of Principles
(Ibid). Although this phrase did not make paragraph 1 of the Declaration of Principles, it was
inserted, word-for-word, in paragraphs 9 and 52 (ITU, 2003a).
In a similar manner, in paragraph 10, Iran suggested that the information society should be
predicated on “The building of an environment that inspires respect for fundamental values
of all cultures” (Ibid: 2).
Iran also called for the inclusion of specific anti-pornography language in paragraph 52, its
amendment seeming to embrace ‘multistakeholderism’ in the practice of combating sexual
abuse of children online:
“The fight against pedophilia and pornography on the internet requires a coalition of forces,
involving children, industry, policy makers, educators and parents to ensure that users are
aware of potential dangers” (Ibid: 3)
Although it expressed some willingness to collaborate with non-governmental groups in
pursuing secondary policy aims, Iran stopped short of advocating multistakeholderism
as the fundamental principle of global internet governance. As with the Ahmadinejad
government that followed, Khatami’s delegation insisted upon the recognition of the
“national sovereignty of all states” in managing the internet (Ibid: 2).
Despite these varied contributions to the early phase of internet governance activity,
Khatami’s government ultimately failed to make a significant impact on the state sovereignty
debate. This set the stage for Ahmadinejad’s government to make more aggressive, and less
collaborative efforts to further Iran’s agenda on this point.
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THROWING STONES // WSIS-05
Iran’s participation at WSIS-05 in Tunis saw a change in tone and strategy. With Khatami’s
conciliatory foreign policy abandoned in favour of a confrontational and openly anti-Western stance, Iran dropped all language relating to the “promotion of a dialogue between
cultures and civilizations”, along with all engagement on governance issues unrelated to
internet sovereignty.
At the 2005 WSIS Preparatory Meeting, Iran made an unprecedentedly assertive move,
setting out a detailed proposal for the development of a multilateral, UN-rooted and
state-driven internet governance council with authority over an ‘internationalised’ ICANN
and IANA, and substantive powers over poorly defined ‘international public policy issues’
(Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005).
We decide to establish an intergovernmental Council for Global Public Policy and
Oversight based on the principles of transparency and democracy with the involvement, in an
advisory capacity, of the private sector, civil society and the relevant intergovernmental and
international organizations. The Council shall be anchored in the United Nations and have,
inter alia, the following functions:

•

Setting of international internet public policy and providing the necessary oversight
relating to internet resource management, especially the related to ICANN/IANA
competence in the areas such as additions or deletions to the root zone file,
management of IP addresses, introduction of Global Top level Domains (gTLDs),
delegation and redelegation of Country Code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs). The
relationship between the Council and technical and operational internet institutions,
such as the reformed and internationalized ICANN/IANA, should be formalized.
In this model, the reformed ICANN/IANA will be accountable to the Council. This
internationalization should be accompanied by an adequate United Nations like hostcountry agreement for reformed ICANN/IANA.

•

In addition, its functions might include international public policy issues relating to
internet resource management and international public policy issues that do not fall
within the scope of other existing intergovernmental organizations.

•

Facilitating negotiation of treaties, conventions and agreements on internet-related
public policies.

•

Fostering and providing guidance on certain developmental issues in the broader
internet agenda, including but not limited to capacity-building, multilingualism,
equitable and cost-based international interconnection costs, and equitable access
for all.

•

Approving rules and procedures for dispute resolution mechanisms and conduct
arbitration, as required. (Ibid)
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Although statements such as these were effective at clearly staking out Iran’s position, the
proposals ultimately failed to gain meaningful support from other sovereignty ‘hawks’ at
WSIS-05. As all major decisions had to be made on the basis of consensus, Iran failed to
make a real splash in sovereignty debates until 2012, when its opportunistic contributions to
WCIT-12 shattered the conference and cleft open the existing fault lines in the international
community.

DROPPING BOMBSHELLS // THE CONTROVERSY AT WCIT-12
WCIT-12 saw a breakdown in international consensus over the question of internet
sovereignty, as developing countries worked together in a concerted effort to challenge
the US’s perceived hegemony over internet regulation organisations such as ICANN. Inês
Nolasco described the process by which state actor ‘hawks’ worked to insert a direct
challenge to the status quo into the revised ITRs, in the non-binding Resolution 3:
“The African States proposed to add text, immediately after the preamble
statement on the protection of human rights, recognising the right of access of member
states to international telecommunications services, i.e. to safeguard non-discriminatory
access to the internet, a proposal which had previously been left out of the draft.
“China, Cuba, Iran, the African states and several Middle East countries supported the
proposal, arguing that there is a connection between human rights and member states’
rights, and that some member states are currently deprived of access to international
telecommunications services and to the internet” (Nolasco, 2013: 6).
RESOLUTION PLEN/3
To foster an enabling environment for the greater growth of the internet

a.

“...all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international
internet governance and for ensuring the stability, security and continuity of the
existing internet and its future development and of the future internet, and that
the need for development of public policy by governments in consultation with all
stakeholders is also recognized.”

David P. Fidler commented that the language utilised by the African States’ contribution was
not dissimilar to that of a Russian proposal that was aborted earlier in proceedings:
“Substantively, Resolution 3 echoed language in the Russian proposal on internet governance,
stating that “all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international
internet governance[.]” Resolution 3 also emphasized that the ITU should remain engaged on
internet governance questions” (Fidler, 2013).
Although it was initially proposed by the African States group, Resolution 3’s fate owes its
eventual inclusion in the Final Acts to a dramatic intervention by the Iranian delegation,
which played a central role in pushing the proposals through WCIT in the face of sustained
US and EU opposition. Iran achieved this by calling for a majority vote on the passage of
23

Resolution 3, in clear violation of existing consensus-based institutional procedures.
The subsequent vote was won 77-33 (with 6 abstentions) by the African-Russian-IranianChinese voting bloc. Inês Nolasco described the proceedings:
“The chairman attempted to set the new proposal aside due to a lack of consensus but Iran
raised a point of order and a formal vote was called. On a show of hands, the proposal was
accepted, now standing as the third paragraph of the preamble” (Nolasco, 2013: 6).
Crepin-Leblond’s account corroborates that of Nolasco, insofar as it describes Iran’s role
in shutting down the debate over the introduction of internet sovereignty language into
Resolution 3:
“[Some states] insisted on the right of states to telecommunication services and put it on a
par basis with human rights. They argued the rights of states [were] the same as the rights of
individuals. One of the most balanced countries, Switzerland, expressed its outrage. Tension
was rising fast. We got lectured by some countries that oppress their people about human
rights.
“And then Iran called for an abrupt end to the discussion, after having intervened more than
any country in the past 2 weeks, and called for a vote — when... on many, many occasions Dr.
Touré and the Chair [had] assured us there would be no vote” (Mueller, 2012).
Although it had no significant input into the drafting of Resolution 3, Iran was instrumental
in its eventual inclusion in the final treaty. Its decision to call for a direct vote on the
resolution was a politically astute move; in recognising the numerical strength of the
sovereignty ‘hawks’, and taking advantage of their frustration at the slow pace of
proceedings, Iran was able to propel the resolution forward despite entrenched opposition
from the US and European states.
In sum, WCIT-12 was a success for Iran. It was able to play a key role in advancing the
agenda of the state sovereignty ‘hawks’, and bloodied the noses of the US and its European
allies in the process. However, despite delivering some shallow political victories for Iran,
the forum was a disaster in terms of actually resolving the issues at hand. The outcome did
little more than exacerbate existing rifts in the international community, with the ‘no’ voters
refusing to adopt the Final Acts on the basis that they were not determined by consensus.
UNFINISHED BUSINESS // NETMUNDIAL 2014
The failure of WCIT-12 to build a consensus on the matter of internet governance model
meant that the issue has continued to crop up at successive international forums since
then. The most significant forum of 2014 was Sao Paolo’s NETmundial multistakeholder
conference, which set out to elaborate a set of globally-accepted principles of internet
governance.
As the first major internet governance event to be held since the 2013 election of Hassan
Rouhani, the NETmundial conference also offers an excellent window into the shifts in policy
and rhetoric that have taken place since the departure of Ahmadinejad.
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Interestingly, Iran’s sole contributor to the NETmundial conference is the same man that was
responsible for Iran’s ‘successes’ driving through sovereignty-focused language at WCIT-12,
Kavous Arasteh. Whereas Arasteh was previously publicly associated with the ICT Ministry
and the CRA, in official NETmundial documentation he is listed as a representative of Iran’s
state-affiliated National Council of Cyberspace (NCC).
Despite Arasteh’s previously disruptive role at WCIT-12, and the small size of Iran’s
delegation, Iran’s contributions to NETmundial were generally constructive. Prior to the
event, the NCC published a summary document describing its objectives and policy
priorities at the forum.
For the most part, these points focused on the future of ICANN and the formulation of
new governance structures that would facilitate a greater level of multilateral involvement
in its management. With the March 2014 announcement that IANA intends to transfer a
number of its core DNS powers to the global multistakeholder community (NTIA, 2014), the
international community has entered a new phase of debate as to the shape of its successor.
Although the NCC report talks positively about the value of a ‘multistakeholder approach’
in internet governance, a great deal of space is devoted to promoting greater authority for
states, with no mention of civil society or private sector involvement. On this point, Iran
advocates the cession of ICANN authority over ccTLDs to national governments, as well as
the strengthening of ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), which grants state
actors a voice in the organisation.
This policy advocacy comes in spite of the NTIA’s assertion that it “will not accept a
proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental
organization solution.” (Ibid)
The NCC recommendation document reads:
ICANN’s status as a public, global governance agency could be accepted and recognized.
There should be lawful constraints on its mission and adequate checks on the potential
for abuse of its authority. These should come from a formal international agreement...
Governments should be involved not as “oversight” authorities but as main and principal
backers of a shared legal framework that maintains accountability in an appropriate
Multistakeholder Model in a Multistakeholder Approach in which all involved constituencies
participate on an equal footing to carry out their role.
An international agreement along these lines should have the following elements:

•

The Multistakeholder Approach with an appropriate Model, yet to be defined;

•

The sovereignty of national governments over ccTLDs should be formally recognized,
and authority over their delegation ceded from ICANN to national governments using
a formal, secure and verifiable process. The e-IANA concept, which allows recognized
ccTLD managers to update their root zone entries directly, should be implemented;
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•

There should be a prohibition on using ICANN for content regulation; the instrument
should also create a right of all parties to initiate legal challenges to ICANN actions
on these grounds;

•

The GAC, together with current function[s] need to be re-thought to examine their
future role in the above-mentioned Multistakeholder Approach;

•

Similarly IANA and its function, if needed, should also be reviewed.
(Iran’s National Council of Cyberspace, 2014: 21-22)

Once again, however, Iran and the ‘hawks’ were unable to build international consensus
around their position, and NETmundial ended without resolving the question of state
sovereignty in internet governance. Klée Aiken and David Lang stated that the conference
was another demonstration that: “Efforts for consensus in net governance have been shown
to be at once fraught and dull. For those who hope to enact change in the system, whether
fundamental or otherwise, simply wishing that a consensus might yet emerge isn’t a viable
option” (Aiken and Lang, 2014).

SEIZABLE ASSETS // IRAN AND THE 2014 ICANN JUDGEMENT
Events in 2014 went some way towards validating Iran’s fear of a US-dominated ICANN. A
lawsuit brought forward by four private citizens in 2014 demanded compensation from Iran
for injuries suffered in a Hezbollah attack in Israel. In an effort to identify seizable US-based
Iranian assets, the Berkman Law Office and the Shurat HaDin Israeli Law Center served
ICANN with writs of attachments and subpoenas in June 2014, to determine whether the
organization had any control over Iran’s ccTLD. The plaintiffs aimed to seize the .ir and ایران.
ccTLDs, and sell them to the highest bidder (McKnight, 2014).
Although a Washington D.C.-based federal judge ruled against the plaintiffs in November
2014 (Farivar, 2014), the controversy has been problematic for ongoing internet governance
debates owing to the fact that ICANN, being subject to US jurisdiction, could feasibly be
compelled to hand over existing ccTLD registries.
The intellectual property lawyer Phil Corwin spoke about the potential implications of
an unfavourable judgement for ICANN & Iran, stating that if .ir and other ccTLDs were
surrendered:
“It would allow Iran and any other country to say, ‘See, we can’t trust ICANN. We’ve put
the control of our own country code TLDs in the hands of an entity subject to U.S. law'”
(McKnight, 2014).
Iran openly appeared rather dismissive of the threat posed to Iran’s TLDs, with Alireza Saleh,
the Director of the .ir domain-holder IRNIC reacting to the June 26 court order against
ICANN by stating that he doubted the feasibility of transferring ownership of TLD names to
US terror victims (Small Media, 2014c).
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BUILDING BRIDGES // INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNET
GOVERNANCE
International development has proven to be a repeated focus of Iran’s presentations at
internet governance forums since 2003. To promote issues of development, Iran has
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Millennium Development Goals,4 and of other
internationally-recognised development treaties and agreements.
The Millennium Development Goals have been the lynchpin, however. In its proposal to
the WSIS-03 Draft Action Plan, Iran suggested that WSIS “Promote further research
programmes on issues related to the goals approved by the United Nations Millennium
Assembly, especially in... developing countries” (Government Of The Islamic Republic Of
Iran, 2003b). More recently, at the WSIS+10 event in June 2014, ICT Minister Mahmood Vaezi
spoke of the need to continue to work towards the Millennium Development Goals (Vaezi,
2014).
Even Ahmadinejad-era delegations to major internet governance events were advocates
for developmental concerns. Although WCIT-12 was dominated by issues surrounding
ICANN and state sovereignty, during WSIS-05 Iran proposed an amendment of Article
1 of the Political Chapeau to include a reference to the 1986 Declaration on the Right to
Development, elevating it to the same position as the UN Declaration on Human Rights:
“...respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
Declaration on the Right to Development...” (ITU, 2005a)
Iran’s preoccupation with development should not necessarily be viewed as incongruous
with the other aspects of its internet governance policy. Rather, Iran’s concern with
development should be understood in the context of its opposition to multistakeholderism.
As Julia Pohle of Vrije Universiteit Brussel explains, “in several instances, multistakeholder
processes actually tend to increase the overrepresentation of actors from the highly
developed Western world, whereas they neglect developing countries, which often lack
independent civil society networks and strong business players that could meaningfully
engage in the existing structures” (2015). As a middling-developed country undergoing
rapid processes of modernisation, Iran’s positions on development and multistakeholderism
are not necessarily unusual.
Given the exhaustive efforts that Iran has gone to to extend internet access domestically,
it is perhaps unsurprising that it has placed infrastructural development at the core of its
internet governance strategy. Its successes in the field of infrastructural development allow
it to boast of its tangible accomplishments at internet governance forums, and portray itself
as a responsible executor of internationally-recognised internet governance objectives.

4 Millennium Development Goal 8.F calls for the expansion of ICT infrastructure: “In cooperation
with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and
communications. Success is measured on the basis of the number of telephone landlines, cellular
phone subscribers, and internet users per 100 people (UNICEF, 2008).
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This narrative has received the public backing of international organisations, as
well; UNESCO has awarded Iran with a special certificate for significantly expanding
telecommunications coverage to tens of thousands of rural villages (UNCTAD, 2010).

SMALL GAINS // INTERNET GOVERNANCE POLICY OVERVIEW
Although it has been involved in internet governance debates for the past ten years, Iran’s
political positions and priorities have shifted remarkably little. It has consistently advocated
for the advancement of state sovereignty principles into the global system of internet
governance, in an effort to secure greater powers for the state over the internet in Iran.
Although the consensus-based format of internet governance conferences has precluded
Iran and its sovereignty hawk allies from radically reforming the international system, it has
achieved some notable political (if intangible) victories.
It has also passively supported efforts to mandate the implementation of surveillance tools
such as DPI into the international system, by supporting the WCIT-12 Final Acts including
ITRs 5A and 5B. Such ITRs may allow Iran to legitimise its policy of filtering internet content
via DPI methods, both internationally and at home. As the ITRs only entered into force in
January 2015, we are yet to see how far Iran leans on the outcome of WCIT-12, but It will
be interesting to see if such regulations form a component of Iran’s self-justifications in the
future.
At the same time as it has supported authoritarian internet filtering measures, Iran has been
one of the loudest proponents of international development targets, and the expansion of
global internet access. Part of Iran’s enthusiasm for development may stem from a desire to
portray itself as a responsible actor in the field of global internet governance, and legitimise
its other positions. But less cynically, Iran has been genuinely radical in its efforts to expand
internet access, and reap the economic and social benefits of the internet.
The general stability of its internet governance objectives over the past decade begs the
question as to why changes in government did not result in more dramatic changes in Iran’s
policy outlook. Is Iran’s policy stability a result of elected governments’ powerlessness in the
face of top-down direction from the Office of the Supreme Leader? Institutional paralysis?
Or have Iran’s previous administrations simply maintained similar conceptions of the national
interest?
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3.
IRANIAN POLICY-MAKING AND COORDINATION

Having established a number of linkages between Iran’s domestic internet policies and its
engagements on the issue of international internet governance, the final chapter of this
report will explore the manner in which Iranian internet policy is formulated.
This discussion will open with a segment exploring the complex—some might say chaotic
and illogical—web of organisations and institutions responsible for overseeing the formation
and execution of internet management and governance policies in the Islamic Republic of
Iran. After presenting a visualisation of the most influential organisations involved in internet
governance events since WSIS-03, the chapter will ascertain the causes and significance of
Iran’s international alliances at these conferences.
Finally, the report will conclude with a discussion around the role of non-state actors in the
formulation of Iranian internet governance policy, firstly by tracking the evolution of media
narratives around internet policy to gain an idea of existing public discourses, and secondly
by evaluating the purpose, outcomes, and significance of the tech sector-led Persian IGF
initiative. The chapter will conclude that although public discourse remains fairly limited in its
depth and scope, there appears to be some space opening up for independent experts and
non-state actors to make greater contributions to the internet governance debate.

I. A TANGLED WEB // WHO SETS INTERNET GOVERNANCE POLICY?
Iran’s domestic policy-making processes are byzantine in their complexity, with a number of
competing bodies vying for authority over issues of internet censorship and infrastructural
development. Whereas Rouhani and his cabinet have expressed some outwardly permissive
attitudes regarding online expression,5 appointed bodies such as the Committee to
Determine Incidences of Criminal Content (CDICC) have consistently opposed the easing of
internet censorship practices.6
Iranian processes for internet governance policy formulation are (unfortunately) no less
baffling. Numerous bodies now appear to be involved in the process of internet governance
policy-making, each with overlapping powers, and shared personnel, making it difficult to
ascertain where policies and strategic planning actually originate.7

5 In September 2014, Rouhani stated publicly that internet censorship policies were ineffective (The
National, 2014). Rouhani, Zarif, and a number of other ministers have themselves been active users of
social networks (Kamali Dehghan, 2013)
6 In September 2014 the head of the CDICC Abdolsamad Khorramabadi threatened to outmaneuvre
the ICT Ministry if it refused to enforce a block on communication apps including Viber and WhatsApp.
For more information, see (Small Media, 2014d)
7 Iran Media Program has produced an infographic mapping out the various actors involved in creating and enforcing domestic internet policies. See (Iran Media Program, 2013)
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This complicated state of affairs has only emerged very recently. Prior to 2012, elected
governments formulated domestic and internet governance policies through the ICT
Ministry. Consequently, Iranian delegates to internet governance forums were entirely
sourced from the ICT Ministry itself, or its subsidiary the Communications Regulatory
Authority of Iran (CRA). In this way, the elected president retained a degree of influence
over the direction of ICT policy, which was conducted through ministerial appointees.
During the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami, the Presidential Office
was involved at a particularly active level, and participated directly in the global internet
governance debate. President Khatami was in personal attendance at the 2003 WSIS event
in Geneva, along with a number of his aides and high-level advisors.
No Iranian administration has played such an active role in internet governance processes
since this time. The subsequent WSIS event, held in Tunis in 2005 was snubbed by
Ahmadinejad, who chose instead to send a rather paltry number of presidential advisors to
Tunis to accompany the ICT Ministry’s delegates. In total, five members of Ahmadinejad’s
Presidential Office attended WSIS-05, down from the ten members of Khatami’s Presidential
Office that attended WSIS-03 (the President among them).
Former Iranian MP Aliakbar Mousavi Khoeini commented that international engagement
on internet governance lost its importance during the Ahmadinejad administration, as ICT
policy turned inward to focus on issues of domestic surveillance and control:
“Unlike the case of the reformist government, when Khatami and the Iranian delegation
attended the Geneva summit, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was not present at the 2005 Tunisia
summit... As the government was actively seeking policies to restrict the internet domestically,
there was little space for participating actively in these international arenas” (Mousavi
Khoeini, 2014).
Although engagement at international events dried up somewhat between 2005-13, a
number of new ICT policy-making bodies flourished towards the end of Ahmadinejad’s term.
The 2012 creation of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), and the 2013 formation of
its subsidiary the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) saw these groups moving into the
field of internet governance.
The SCC is comprised of 20 members, 13 of whom are drawn from government ministries
and affiliated organisations, with the remaining 7 appointed directly by the Supreme Leader
(Small Media, 2014e). The SCC’s decisions are therefore informed by the political positions
of both the elected government and the unelected Supreme Leader. Although the majority
of the SCC’s responsibilities relate to domestic policy formulation, the organisation’s official
2012 mission statement includes one goal with direct relevance for internet governance:
Increase [Iran’s] international engagement and influence on internet issues (Ibid)
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Meanwhile the NCC, established in 2013 to execute SCC policy, has a number of
responsibilities relevant to international internet governance policy formation. These include:

-

Preparation for a cultural war between Iran and its enemies
Protecting the country against cyber attacks
Collaborating with other nations and governments to decrease the influence of
superpower nations over the internet, and to protect the international rights of
Iranian users (Ibid)

This final provision suggests that the NCC plays a significant role in determining internet
governance policy. In fact, since 2013, the organisation has had some presence at
international internet governance events. Although ITU events have continued to see
participation from ICT Ministry delegates, the sole Iranian attendee of the 2014 NETmundial
conference was Mr. Kavous Arasteh, who was listed as a member of the NCC (NETmundial,
2014b).
Confusingly, Arasteh has previously been listed as a member of the ICT Ministry’s own
delegation at internet governance events, and as an ICT Ministry representative he was the
influential player within the Iranian delegation at WCIT-12, orchestrating the contentious
vote that plunged the forum into chaos (Centr, 2012: 3). He continues to be listed as a Senior
Advisor to the ICT Ministry, and a member of the Communications Regulatory Authority in
ITU documents dating from early 2014.
Such peculiarities suggest that there is a broad overlap between the personnel and powers
of the ICT Ministry, SCC and NCC, to the extent that delineating each organisation’s precise
role and responsibilities becomes essentially impossible. What can be said is that despite
the apparent division of responsibilities, the ICT Ministry appears to retain the largest profile
amongst Iranian organisations participating at internet governance events.
Also notable is the complete lack of Iranian civil society or private sector engagement in
internet governance forums in recent years; all participants since WSIS-05 have been from
state bodies, reflecting the Iranian government’s public stance in support of a multilateral,
but not necessarily multistakeholder model of internet governance.
Even at WSIS-05, when the Ahmadinejad administration sent a not-insubstantial ‘Cultural
and Scientific Delegation’ composed of academics and private sector representatives, there
is no evidence to suggest that the non-governmental delegates played a significant role in
devising or advancing Iranian policy objectives.
The following visualisation shows the organisations that have participated in major
internet governance events since WSIS-03. It demonstrates how the composition of
Iranian delegations has changed dramatically over the past 12 years, with various levels of
presidential interest, and a shifting array of official and semi-official organisations taking the
lead in engaging with international internet governance events.
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IGF 2006
Iranian Youth ICT NGO
IGF 2007
Computer Research Center of Islamic Sciences;
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IGF 2008
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences
IGF 2014
National Centre of Cyberspace
ITU PP 2010
AmirKabir University; Fars News Agency; Iranian
Space Agency

ITU PP 2014
Center for Strategic Research; Economic
Cooperation Organization; Naftiran Oil Company;
Oil Industries Engineering and Construction;
Tarbiat Modares University
WCIT 2012
Iran Post Company
WSIS 2003
Deputy Permanent Representative (Geneva);
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance; Ministry
of Post Telegraph and Telephone; Planning and
Budget Organization

WSIS 2005
Cultural Heritage Organization; Education
Planning and Research Organization; Electronic
Publishers Association; Embassy of the Islamic
Republic Of Iran In Tunis; International Library of
Shiraz; Iran Free/Open Source Project; Iran
Internet Companies Association; Iran University of
Science and Industry; Isfahan Science and
Technology Center; Management and Planning
Organization; Ministry of Education; Ministry of
Welfare and Social Security; National Iranian Oil
Company; National Organization of Youths;
Rooyesh Information and Communication
Technology Incubator; Shiraz Research Center;
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution;
Tehran Municipality; WSIS National Committee

II. INFLUENCING PEOPLE // INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES
Having offered a comprehensive overview of Iran’s policy-making bodies and processes, and
their delegations to internet governance forums, this report now considers the nature and
efficacy of Iran’s strategic alliances with other countries at these events.
Despite having found itself increasingly isolated in recent years, Iran has managed to
position itself as an influential player in the global faction of ‘sovereignty hawks’ pushing for
radical reform of the internet governance system.
This segment of the report describes how Iran has integrated itself into this network
of hawks, while teasing open the policy differences it has with its allies. This analysis is
presented through the prism of Iran’s proposals and amendments to internet governance
documents, along with its statements in support of other countries’ proposals.
Iran’s alliances at internet governance forums frequently deviate from its geopolitical
alignments. Although Iran has endured crippling isolation from the international community
over the past decade, and has maintained a stance of open antagonism with the US and
Europe, it has been remarkably flexible in its willingness to negotiate and ally with its
geopolitical adversaries, whether from the West, or elsewhere in the MENA region.
The difficulty of securing a comprehensive collection of conference transcripts, or detailed
records of Iran’s comments at preparatory meetings and forums means that we are unable
to provide a complete overview of Iran’s diplomatic wrangling.8 Nonetheless, this section
uses available sources to illustrate the diverse array of alliances and policy alignments that
Iran has participated in over the past decade.

LOOKING WESTWARD // UNLIKELY PARTNERS AT WSIS-03
The Iranian delegation at WSIS-03 was the most conciliatory of any of the delegations
covered in this study, and demonstrated some of the most striking openness towards its
traditional opponents.
One of the most notable developments at WSIS-03 was the European Commission’s
surprising intervention criticising the existing US-dominated model of internet governance,
and proposing the establishment of a ‘new cooperation model’ that would assume
responsibility over a number of key areas of internet governance policy. Its proposal read:
The new cooperation model should include the development and application of globally
applicable public policy principles and provide an international government involvement at
the level of principles over the following naming, numbering and addressing-related matters:

8 The Iranian government and the ITU share reservations about the concept of transparency, and
consequently documents can be difficult to acquire.
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a.

Provision for a global allocation system of IP number blocks, which is equitable
and efficient;

b.

Procedures for changing the root zone file, specifically for the insertion of new top
level domains in the root system and changes of ccTLD managers;

c.

Establishment of contingency plans to ensure the continuity of crucial DNS
functions;

d.

Establishment of an arbitration and dispute resolution mechanism based on
international law in case of disputes;

e.

Rules applicable to DNS system (European Union, 2003).

Iran enthusiastically supported the proposals (alongside Saudi Arabia and China). This
enthusiastic support brought the wrath of former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt, who
expressed his concern about the EC proposals being ‘hijacked’ by authoritarian countries
(Wray, 2005).
Europe would reverse its outright opposition to the status quo at future events, and take
a position more in line with that of the United States. Nonetheless, the events at WSIS-03
demonstrated that Iran’s positions at internet governance forums were not fuelled purely by
an ideologically-rooted antagonism with the West; if the policies of Western powers aligned
with Iran’s interests, there was the potential for positive engagement and consensus.

KNOWING YOUR FRIENDS // ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, INTERNET
FREEDOM, AND POLICY ALIGNMENT
It is worth reiterating that a preoccupation with the issue of state sovereignty in internet
governance is not unique to Iran; it is certainly no ‘rogue state’. The WCIT-12 vote illustrated
this explicitly, dividing the international community into two camps correlating with their
economic development, and internet freedom scores.
The following visualisation plots WCIT-12 votes, Human Development Index scores, and
Internet Freedom rankings. In doing so, it demonstrates how the dissenters at WCIT-12
were not only those countries with high levels of internet freedom, but were also almost
exclusively highly-developed and based in the Global North. Authoritarianism is not the only
rationale for advocating ICANN reform; there seems to be general agreement amongst the
nations of the Global South that the existing system is deeply inequitable.

34

VOTE ON THE WCIT-12 FINAL ACTS
BY COUNTRY
Position on the Human
Development Index

Pink= Voted No

COUNTRY NAMEINTERNET
FREEDOM RATING

Green= Voted Yes
Length=
Human Development Index
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JORDAN- 45
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RUSSIA- 52
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EGYPT- 59
THAILAND- 61
SUDAN- 63
U.A.E- 66
BELARUS- 69

NOT FREE

SAUDI ARABIA- 71
BAHRAIN- 71
VIETNAM- 73
UZBEKISTAN- 77
CHINA (PRC)- 85
CUBA- 86
IRAN- 90
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Although at WCIT-12 Iran was a member of a coalition of developing and moderately
developed states from the Global South, it should be emphasised that this was a very loose
alliance-of-convenience united by vague desires to reform ICANN. Whereas Iran was joined
by democratic nations such as Brazil and South Africa in the vote, there is no evidence that
Iran has ever engaged in any degree of bilateral policy coordination with these states.
On the contrary, there is evidence that the internet governance policies of Iran and the
democratic hawks have diverged to a large degree since their united display at WCIT-12.
Mueller describes how the primary coordinator of Brazilian internet governance policy is
the corporatist Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI), which is made up of members
from civil society, government, academia, and the private sector (Mueller and Wagner,
2014: 14). Such a multistakeholder approach has encouraged Brazilian policy to become
more sympathetic to ICANN, paving the way for Brazil’s coordination of the NETmundial
conference in conjunction with the organisation (Ibid, 1-2).
Up to the present, Iran’s relationship with ICANN has not experienced a comparable
shift towards multistakeholderism. Although there is evidence that Iran is beginning to
experiment with multistakeholder initiatives at the domestic level,9 its policy objectives
continue to be rooted in an intergovernmental conception of internet governance. Such
divergence suggests that the notion of a broad ‘Global South’ coalition is essentially
baseless.

NATURAL PARTNERS? // AUTHORITARIANISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCES
Although Iran has found temporary allies in the Global South, the most frequent incidences
of policy alignment have been with countries that have pushed to extend state authority
over domestic networks. These partners have included geopolitical allies such as Russia,
Syria, or China, but also bitter rivals like Saudi Arabia.
The confluence of Iran and Saudi Arabia’s policy objectives are evident at WSIS-05, when
both countries’ delegations advocated for the introduction of state sovereignty language
into the WGIG proposals. Saudi Arabia’s proposal read:
“[The Arab Group] would propose rewording of the present text to reflect respect for
sovereignty of States and leaving the selection of mechanisms to States to decide what is
suitable for their respective circumstances” (Saudi Arabia/Arab Group, 2005).
In a similar manner, Iran called for:
“[the establishment of] an intergovernmental Council for Global Public Policy and Oversight”
(Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005).

9 Chapter III.iv offers a detailed account of the objectives, outcomes and implications
of the Persian IGF.
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While the objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia are closely aligned, there is no real evidence of
direct policy coordination between the two states. Although they have broadly pursued the
same objectives, the two geopolitical rivals have done so in an independent manner, rather
than as intimate allies.
Russia has been a somewhat closer partner for Iran. At WSIS-05, their policy alignments
were evident at the Preparatory Stage, and were synchronised by way of some collaborative
activities. Iran’s proposed amendment to include the phrase ‘national sovereignty’ in the first
article of the Political Chapeau was directly co-sponsored by Russia and Azerbaijan (ITU,
2005a).
Iran’s alignment with Russia has continued well into 2014. The Centre for Internet and
Society grouped the countries together in its analysis of countries’ proposals to the
NETmundial conference, in that they both advocate the transfer of IANA’s functions
to a multilateral body (2014). Iran’s insistence that NETmundial resolve to facilitate an
“Agreement on the need to Internationalize... Internet Governance” (National Centre of
Cyberspace, 2014: 33) is directly comparable to Russia’s contribution, which argues that “it
is necessary to define what should be regulated at the international level” (State Duma of
the Russian Federation, 2014).
Although such proposals point towards a high degree of policy alignment between Iran
and Russia, as with the case of Saudi Arabia, there is limited evidence to suggest that state
authorities are in direct contact to coordinate their contributions to internet governance
events. For instance, in the aforementioned Political Chapeau of WSIS-05, Iran and
Russia’s proposal to include the phrase ‘national sovereignty’ is the only one on which their
contributions are mutually-supportive.
Only one of Iran’s other contributions is supported by another state, where Iran and Algeria
agree to ‘remove square brackets’ in Article 14. The authoritarian ‘coalition’ of Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Russia, China and Cuba each made their own suggestions as to how the Political
Chapeau should be modified, suggesting that—at the Preparatory Stages at least—the level
of direct policy coordination between authoritarian states is low, and that Iran is essentially
an autonomous actor when devising and advancing internet governance policies.

III. BLACKOUT // INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN THE IRANIAN MEDIA
Considering the efforts made by the Iranian government to loudly advocate for the dramatic
transformation of the global internet governance system, it is surprising how little coverage
its efforts receive in the domestic press. Until recently, articles concerning Iran’s activities
at internet governance events were nearly non-existent. Small Media was unable to find
evidence of any Persian-language articles containing the term ‘internet governance’ prior to
December 2004, and only six dating from 2004-2011.
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In 2012, the number of articles concerning ‘internet governance’ spiked, although coverage
remained exceedingly scarce on major news outlets. Four articles were published in 2012
alone, with three following in 2013 and 2014. The following segment shall demonstrate how
the Iranian press has provided support to the Iranian government’s position on internet
governance issues, whilst offering generally favourable coverage of the state’s halting
attempts to cultivate domestic engagement.
But first, we present the following visualisation showing the evolution of press narratives
relating to internet governance events. Extracts have been taken from all relevant Persianlanguage news articles from the Iranian press, and overlaid on the ‘Events Timeline’
visualisation seen earlier in the report.
The visualisation also demonstrates that press discussions about internet governance issues
have only ‘boomed’ in the past year, and that such articles are still confined to the ‘specialist’
IT press.
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PRESS TIMELINE
How to Read
Event
Descriptive // Introductions to Internet Governance
These articles introduced readers to internet governance issues in a descriptive, and mostly even-handed manner. Some are more detailed
than others, but all are generally disengaged from the more emotive questions of state involvement in internet governance.
State-focused // Critical of US
Reflecting the state’s increasing hostility to US internet governance policy under Ahmadinejad, the press grew more critical of the US’s
position from 2008 onwards. Many of the most hostile articles were written in 2012, in the same year that Iran led the charge against the US
position at the WCIT-12 conference. Critiques of the US position have continued into 2014, though their frequency has declined.
Civil society-focused // Promoting Civil Society Involvement
In 2013-14 the press switched its focus to the Persian IGF, an Iran-based event that promised to involve tech and internet governance experts
more substantively in the policy-making process.
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12/2003
World Summit on Information Society I,
Geneva

7
2/2/2007
Hamshahr: Another introduction to WSIS
It seems that one of the difficulties
between now and 2015 will be how to
effectively make a distinction between
these three currents… the government
sector seeking authority, the private sector
seeking profit, and the civil sector seeking
independence. (Hamshahr)
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10/12/2004
Tebyan: What is ‘internet governance’?
The debate emerging from the World
Summit on the Information Society Forum
2013 in Geneva could be, in one sense,
seen as a debate over control or the
4
freedom of ideas and in another sense a
19/4/2008
debate over equal access. In the area of
Aftab: US role in managing ICANN
control and freedom one can trace civil
Even though the US has not yet used
groups, freedom seekers, supporters of the
ICANN to limit internet access, it has the
promotion of human rights and radical
capability to do so, and the very existence
groups but in the area of equality of
of this capability has been a cause of
access, there are issues related to the
concern for many world politicians
potential risks of access based on wealth
and power. (Tebyan)
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10/5/2008
Vista: An ‘overview’ of internet governance, with harsh critiques of the US
It can be generally concluded that the
internet is guided by a centralised
US-based system, and this is the source of
a heated global debate over the management of the internet. When the US faced
signs of resistance against the monopoly
of the ICANN from the EU, the US lost its
biggest ally.
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5/2/2005
ITAnalyse: The objectives of WSIS-05
The information society is a revolution
which is comparable with the revolution of
the alphabet, or the printing press. This
new culture is a phenomenon based on
symbols, codes, models, programmes,
formal languages, algorithms and new
ideas which require ‘information literacy’.
(ITAnalyse)
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11/2005
World Summit on Information Society II,
Tunis

C
10,11/2005 - 10,11/2016 (Annually)
Internet Governance Forum
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3/5/2010
Jam-e Jam: What’s the role of the IGF?
One of the most important outcomes of
the World Summit on Information Society
was the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which does not have
any executive power and acts merely in a
passive leadership capacity… This forum
does not issue any resolutions or orders,
and merely provides suggestions and
recommendations for global society.

11/12/2012
ISNA: The US and EU form a united front
The US and Western countries are now
seeking to form alliances and a unified
front to exploit some of the existing
weaknesses of the ITU, so that they can
once again defend against efforts to
challenge their undisputed governance of
the internet.
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12/2012
World Conference on International
Communications

11
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8/12/2012
Fars News: US and EU guard status quo
against global opposition
The US, the EU and other Western
countries strive to defend the chaotic
conditions of today while Russia, China
and many African and Arabic countries
claim that the internet is undermining their
national laws while benefiting American
corporations.
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8/12/2012
Amin-e Jameeh: The EU and Russia unite
against US on internet sovereignty
Countries like Russia and the EU deeply
believe that the laws and regulations of
internet governance should be under the
leadership of the International Telecommunication Union. One of the reasons that
members of the EU have suggested is of
course the issue of censorship and
freedom of online speech that they have
underlined”
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4/10/2012
Mashregh News: US hypocrisy on mass
surveillance
The US Senate is seeking to oppose any
supervision or monitoring of the internet at
the same time as the US manages various
internet surveillance bodies, spies on its
own people and the people of the world
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28/10/2013
Fars News: Iran involving experts in
preparations for WSIS-14
Ali Asghar Ansari, at the Development and
Administration Office of the National
Information Network, said: ‘by holding
professional workshops and preparing a
national report we aim to have an effective
presence in the WSIS 2014 forum. We aim
to have a seminar in the country before the
beginning of this forum in which we will
examine how to achieve our goals and
objectives.’
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6/9/2014
ITNA: Persian IGF/Persian ICT Week was
messy, and achieved little
The obscurity of the objectives of the
conference led the speakers to just express
their own concerns and their individual
concerns. Therefore, the topics discussed
in the conference ranged from the First
Vice President’s emphasis on increasing
internet speeds, to speeches about
potential applications of the internet.

9/3/2013
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Ghatreh: US and allies blocked reform at
WCIT-12
27/10/2014
14
The ITU has long been a facilitator in the
Taamol News: There’s a global consensus
regulation of telecommunications. But
10/3/2014
around ending US internet hegemony
now, it has begun to hold a series of
ANA: Persian IGF will allow Iranians to
At the moment, the internet is entirely
summits, forums and meetings to update
make bigger impact on internet governance
dependent on the US, which poses
its commitments to include internet
debates
economic and security threats for the rest
regulation, too. Last December’s supposed
The Persian IGF is one of the regional fora
of the world. It seems that in the current
failure of a summit, WCIT-12, produced a
for internet governance and seeks to
circumstances, internet governance should
30-page document that was signed by 89
prepare the grounds for the participation
move towards establishing ‘a sustainable,
countries, but opposed by the US its allies,
of Iranians in global internet policy
decentralised, and coherent network,
including the EU and Canada.
decision-making processes, with the
accessible to all.
support of the Nasr Organisation of Tehran.
This is a regional forum for debate and
13/10/2013
discussion about the future of internet
YJC: The Persian IGF is an opportunity for
governance, which seeks to expand the
experts and civil society
role of Iranian users in important
Given the country’s ongoing isolation in
decision-making processes. cyberspace
issues of global internet governance, it
and the access of Iranians to information
seems that establishing a Persian-s
about internet governance issues.
peaking body called the “Persian IGF”
can contribute to the development of the
E
country’s international communications,
and open up new pathways for consultants
4/2014
and experts to contribute to internet
E.NETmundial: Global Multistakeholder
governance decision-making processes.
Meeting on the Future of Internet
Governance

GENERAL IGNORANCE // MEDIA AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE
AWARENESS
Aliakbar Mousavi Khoeini has criticised the scant coverage that has been offered by the
Iranian press on the topic of internet governance, suggesting that it lacks in detail, and
offers weak analysis of the major contemporary issues in the field:
“Inside the country, the participation of an authority or a delegation from Iran is covered
very broadly and details are usually left out. Therefore, in this sense there has been little
tangible change.”
Khoeini attributes the lack of coverage to a potent cocktail of censorship and widespread
ignorance about the key issues in contemporary internet governance debates:
“Unfortunately these issues are censored in the news of Persian media inside Iran. Even
international Persian media outside the country have given little coverage to such issues.
Therefore, sometimes there is little knowledge or awareness of the functions of these
institutions or organisations in society” (Mousavi Khoeini, 2014).
Mahmood Enayat agrees that general ignorance about the role of internet governance
organisations is proving to be one of the biggest barriers to wider engagement on internet
governance issues:
“There’s coverage in niche areas of the tech press, definitely; at least for those people who are
interested. But in terms of the conversation in the wider sector, I don't think that many people
actually know—even in the IT sector—what the IGF is” (Enayat, 2014).
Although the press has been fairly poor at covering international internet governance
events, there has been a marked increase in the number of articles on the topic since 2012.
However, the majority of articles written since then have been concerned primarily with
criticisms of the US’s position on internet governance issues rather than providing in-depth
introductions to the topic.

LOOKING INWARD // MEDIA AND DOMESTIC INITIATIVES
Domestic internet governance events began to receive greater attention from 2013 onwards.
In October 2013, state-affiliated media promoted the then-upcoming Persian IGF as an
important event that would foster internet governance dialogues within Iran, and enable
civil society and specialists to contribute to policy formation. A 2013 post from the state
broadcaster IRIB-affiliated Young Journalists’ Club (YJC, 2013) reads:
“Given the country’s ongoing isolation in issues of global internet governance, it seems
that establishing a Persian-speaking body called the “Persian IGF” can contribute to the
development of the country’s international communications, and open up new pathways for
consultants and experts to contribute to internet governance decision-making processes.”
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In the immediate run-up to the event, the Azad Free University-affiliated news site Azad
Free News (2014) was upbeat about the potential impact of the Persian IGF on public
awareness of internet governance issues, writing:
“The Persian IGF is one of the regional fora for internet governance and seeks to prepare the
grounds for the participation of Iranians in global internet policy decision-making processes,
with the support of the Nasr Organisation of Tehran.
This is a regional forum for debate and discussion about the future of internet governance,
which seeks to expand the role of Iranian users in important decision-making processes,
cyberspace and the access of Iranians to information about internet governance issues.”
The press’ preoccupation with the Persian IGF in 2013-14 marks a departure from its
previous record of covering internet governance issues, where it focused almost exclusively
on criticising the United States’ position vis-à-vis ICANN and IANA. The press narrative
appears to have evolved somewhat in recent years, with the objective of promoting
domestic dialogue around internet governance issues, and emphasising the importance
of involving experts and the tech community in decision-making processes. It will be
interesting to see how these trends develop in the wake of the first Persian IGF event, to
which this report now turns.

IV. SHOWING INITIATIVE // THE PERSIAN IGF
Since its launch in 2006, the popularity of the IGF has lead to the creation of several
regional events, in which the IGF’s approach and procedures are replicated on a smaller
scale. In 2014, Iran followed the trend by convening the Persian IGF, an internet governance
event aimed at the Persian-speaking community, including stakeholders in Iran, Afghanistan
and Tajikistan.
The origins of the Persian IGF lie in an online training session covering internet governance
processes convened in preparation for the 2013 IGF meeting in Bali. The session was
organised by an informal working group and supported by Iran’s Top Level Domain registry
(IRNIC) and the Tehran ICT Guild (TIG) (Persian IGF, 2014a). At the 2013 IGF meeting, the
working group held a pre-event conference to announce the formation of the Persian IGF.
Organisers describe how this announcement was met with great excitement from the global
internet governance community (ibid).
In a February 2014 letter to the (global) Internet Governance Forum Secretariat, organisers
outlined the objectives of the Persian IGF: “[the] Persian Internet Governance Forum
(Persian IGF) is purposed to provide a multistakeholder venue where different stakeholder
groups discuss and exchange knowledge, viewpoints and ideas about current and emerging
internet governance issues” (ibid). Originally planned to focus exclusively on Iran, the event
broadened its scope to include the entire Persian-speaking community, with members in
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and the Iranian diaspora (ibid). With support from the Lebanese ICT
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industry organisation IJMA3 and the Tehran ICT Guild (TIG) (IJMA3, 2014), the stage was set
for the first Persian IGF conference to be convened in Tehran in August 2014.
Beyond the general overview sketched above, very little information is available in English
on the Persian IGF. However, Small Media has located a publicly available, Persian-language
Persian IGF mailing list, in which various organisers and participants discussed the goals,
processes, and obstacles involved in convening this forum. We have analysed a number of
documents from this mailing list, and verified their contents with an array of external experts
in order to piece together an overview of the Persian IGF’s objectives and outcomes. This
segment presents our findings.10
The aim of this chapter is not to extrapolate any definitive conclusions from a discussion
of the Persian IGF; rather, this chapter seeks to shed some light on an opaque and underreported event by presenting accounts from the organisers themselves (Persian IGF,
2014b).11 The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the possible implications of the
Persian IGF, and considers whether it may signal the beginning of a shift in Tehran’s position
on multistakeholderism, and internet governance policy more generally.

HUMBLE BEGINNINGS // PLANNING AND INITIAL DEVELOPMENTS
According to the online Persian IGF group, the idea for a Persian IGF grew out of the
observation that Persian-speaking stakeholders were relatively absent from global
internet governance events. The plan was to create a venue in which the Persian-speaking
community could discuss internet governance issues of concern. The launch of the Persian
IGF was first announced by a group of Iranian internet governance experts at the 8th annual
IGF conference in Bali.
The next step for organisers was to return to Iran and search for an organisation to host and
sponsor the event. Organisers eventually settled on IJMA3, a Lebanese NGO specialising
in ICT4D. The event was co-hosted by the Tehran ICT Guild, an organisation that facilitates
relationships between the government and private sector tech companies in Iran (IJMA3,
2014).
After signing a contract with IJMA3, the organisers announced the formation of a
Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) and solicited applications. There were some
concerns because the number of applicants was quite small, but given the arcane and
technical nature of internet governance policy, it is understandable that few people would
be both interested and qualified.

10 We reached out to a the Lebanon-based partner organisation IJMA3, and governmental conference
attendees, but received no response. The insights that can be drawn from the following discussion are
therefore necessarily limited.

11 Unless otherwise noted, all of the information in this section was obtained via the Persian IGF
mailing list (available at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/persian-igf)
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After much wrangling, a MAG was formed, meetings were convened (Persian ICT Week,
2014), and it seemed that everything was in place for the launch of the Persian IGF. But
despite all this preparation, the event never got off the ground. Before venturing into an
exploration of the potential implications of the Persian IGF, this chapter will first revisit
the event’s organising processes, in order to build a picture of the various challengers the
organisers faced.

ORGANISED CHAOS // LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES
Organising any large-scale event comes with its fair share of logistical challenges, and the
Persian IGF was no exception. Yet standard organisational issues were compounded by the
sensitive and often chaotic nature of internet issues in Iran. Problems first began to arise
early on, when some Iranian stakeholders were not happy that the event was being hosted
by a foreign organisation. However, the justification for allowing an outside group to host
the event was based on the notion of neutrality: organisers reasoned that as a non-Iranian
organisation, IJMA3 could serve as an unbiased administrator capable of speaking freely and
acting impartially.
Another contentious issue concerned the lack of transparency in the MAG selection process.
The opacity of the process enabled various organisations with vested interests to try to push
the conference in a direction that would be favourable to them. Moreover, applications from
the Iranian diaspora prompted anxiety among some of the organisers, who worried that
these expatriates might raise human rights concerns that would not sit well with the Iranian
government.
Conflicts over the MAG selection process, the opacity of the meetings, and the
dissatisfaction of some individuals and stakeholder groups lead to an urgent meeting
between various stakeholders, which featured the active participation of the government,
technical community and private sector.
Participants decided, through a multistakeholder process, that the best course of action was
to change the composition of the MAG, take measures to increase its transparency, and
recruit supporting organizations.
While this decision ultimately failed to resolve the problems facing the Persian IGF, the
process by which it was reached—coupled with the active participation of the government
in that process—may portend intimations of a departure from Iran’s general tendency to
emphasize state sovereignty in internet governance debates.
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TAKING AN INTEREST // THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
In the early planning stages of the Persian IGF, there was a general perception among
stakeholders that the Iranian government would not be particularly interested in
participating. Yet as the process went on, the event began to pique the government’s
interest. ICT Ministry employees and affiliates began to show up to preparatory meetings,
and became involved with the process of drafting a multistakeholder memorandum of
understanding (MOU).
This is not to suggest that the Iranian government exerted excessive influence over the
event; available evidence suggests that the government participated on equal footing
with other stakeholder groups. The central point is that the forum was spearheaded by
civil society, the private sector and the technical community; it attracted the government’s
attention only after it became more active.
It is difficult to say authoritatively what prompted the government’s interest in the Persian
IGF. One possible explanation concerns soft power. Given the warm reception that the idea
of convening a Persian IGF received at the global IGF in Bali, the Iranian government may
have wanted its name associated with such a favourably viewed initiative.
It is also possible that Iran’s government saw in the Persian IGF a potential venue for
domestic policy formulation, and wanted to ensure it had a seat at the table. Whatever
attracted the government’s attention, the fact remains that the development of the Persian
IGF was led by the Iranian tech sector, rather than being an initiative organised by the state
in a top-down manner.
Given that the event has so far failed to get off the ground, any discussions around
the significance of the forum and potential motivations for government involvement
remain somewhat speculative. Yet the leading role played by civil society and other
non-governmental stakeholder groups in organising the Persian IGF, coupled with the
government’s participation in a multistakeholder format, represent an interesting contrast to
Iran’s generally state-centric approach to internet governance events.
While the Persian IGF was ultimately unsuccessful, the process suggests that there is space
for non-governmental stakeholders in Iran’s internet governance debates. Whether or not
Iranian civil society groups, internet experts, and private sector organisations will be able
to assume a greater role at global governance forums is an interesting question for further
research to address.
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CONCLUSIONS

This report has established a number of key features of Iran’s engagements with the
international debate around internet governance, along with some insights into the evolving
processes of policy formation and implementation in the Islamic Republic under President
Rouhani.
Below, we present a number of our main conclusions, along with some suggestions as to
future research questions.

•

Iran’s primary objective has been to challenge existing internet governance
structures, most notably the United States’ privileged position vis-à-vis IANA and
ICANN
Iran has achieved some notable political victories in its campaign against the status
quo, delivering a bloody nose to the US and its allies at WCIT-12. But these victories
have ultimately proven hollow, and Iran has ultimately failed to secure widespread
international backing for its position.

•

Secondary objectives have included international development and expansion of
filtering capabilities
Iran has very consistently stressed its dedication to the pursuit of the Millennium
Development Goals, with the Khatami, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani administrations
each clearly advocating for the expansion of internet access in Iran, including
ambitious initiatives in rural regions.
This position is rooted in a few key concerns: firstly, a sincere desire to harness the
economic and social potential of the internet. Secondly, by presenting itself as a
mature and responsible executor of globally accepted development standards, Iran
is able to boost its credibility on a wider range of internet governance issues and
thereby accrue greater political capital.

•

It is too simplistic to say that Iran allies only with authoritarian countries on
internet governance issues
Although Iran’s most consistent partners have been authoritarian nations (Russia
seemingly the most reliable), it has participated in loose coalitions with democratic
developing nations like Brazil, although the nature of their opposition to the existing
ICANN regime differs substantively.
Iran does not always support the proposals of other authoritarian nations, nor do its
own proposals always receive their support. A lack of mutually-reinforcing proposals
at preparatory events suggest that policy is only very loosely co-ordinated at the
inter-state level.
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•

Public discourse around internet governance issues in Iran remains generally
underdeveloped, and the quantity and quality of media coverage is lacking
Press coverage of core internet governance issues and events remains scarce,
and is generally relegated to niche outlets targeted at the tech community. When
internet governance topics do infiltrate the mainstream media, coverage is frequently
politicised, and framed entirely around the perceived hegemony of the United States.

•

Internet governance is essentially a government-monopolised initiative in Iran,
with civil society generally excluded from decision-making processes, however,
recent events have suggested that the government may be willing to engage with
domestic multistakeholder processes at some level
Historically, the state has played a dominant role in debating, making, and executing
internet governance policy in Iran. Civil society groups have been broadly excluded
from Iran’s delegations to internet governance forums since the beginning of the
Ahmadinejad administration.
However, there are some hints that the Rouhani administration may be willing to
engage with the issue of internet governance in a more open manner than that of his
predecessor. Although domestic internet governance initiatives such as the Persian
IGF have so far been poorly attended, and lacking in tangible achievements, the
government’s willingness to allow tech experts to take the lead in its organisation
may pave the way for greater state engagement with multistakeholder initiatives.

As stated previously, there are limits to the accessibility of documents, owing to a dearth
of transparency in both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ITU. While this report cannot
present a comprehensive record of Iran’s engagements with the internet governance debate,
it has provided a unique and insightful overview of Iran’s past and present engagements
with key questions in the field of internet governance, and serves as a jumping off point,
posing a number of useful questions that we urge other researchers to take forward in
future investigations.
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